A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation by Ortuño, Ignacio
A spatial model of political competition and
proportional representation
Ignacio Ortun8 o-Ortı´n
University of Alicante and Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Economicas
Abstract. A spatial model of party competition is studied in which: (i) Parties
are supposed to have ideology. By this we mean that their goal is to maximize
the welfare of their constituencies. (ii) The policy implemented after the
election does not need to coincide with the one proposed by the winner. The
policy implemented should be a compromise that considers the proposals
made by the different parties. In the case of proportional representation this
compromise is modeled as a convex combination of the proposed policies
with weights proportional to the number of votes obtained by each party. We
provide some existence theorems and compare the equilibrium in our model
with the equilibrium that exists under some probabilistic models. It is also
shown that proportional representation will create incentives for the parties to
announce radical platforms.
I. Introduction
In the classical Hotelling—Downs model of elections (Hotelling 1929; Downs
1957) it is assumed that there exists a one-dimensional and compact space in
which the policies proposed by parties can be seeing as points. Agents have
well-defined preferences over such space and vote for the party whose propo-
sal is closest to their most preferred point. The objective function of parties is
to win the election. To achieve this goal, each party proposes the policy that
maximizes the votes in its favor, taking the other party’s proposal as fixed.
The author is grateful to Luis Corcho´n, John Roemer and Christian Shultz for many
helpful comments, as well as to seminar participants in Universities of Copenhagen
and Alicante. I also thank an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions. Financial
support from Spanish Ministry of Education, projects no. PB93-0940 and PB94-1504
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This approach has produced very important insights and conclusions. The
most famous of these conclusions is the ‘‘principle of minimum differenti-
ation’’. In the two party case, under certain strong assumptions, the policies
proposed converge toward the median voter’s most preferred point. During
the last two decades many extensions and modifications of the basic model
have been proposed. Because of these modifications ‘‘minimum differenti-
ation’’ is not longer accepted as a general principle. The basic insight, how-
ever, is still valid: parties have strong incentives to converge in their proposed
policies (see an excellent edited survey on spatial political competition by
Enelow and Hinich (1990), and a more recent one on political economy by
Barnett et al. (1993)). However if the policy space is of high dimension then an
equilibrium may not exist.
Most of these extensions and modifications share a basic assumption of
the original Hotelling—Downs model: the objective function of the parties.
They continue characterizing a political party as an institution whose goal is
to win the election. Some authors think, however, that it is not clear that the
objective function of parties is best modeled by maximization of vote support.
Ginsburgh et al. (1987) Wittman (1983, 1990), Calvert (1985), Roemer (1993,
1994) and Shultz (1995) assume that parties are ‘‘ideological’’, meaning that
they have preferences over the space of admissible policies. Their objective
here will be to adopt the strategy that will induce the best possible policy
according to their preferences. Those authors also assume that there is
uncertainty about the outcome of the election. The result now is that, in
general, parties’ proposals do not converge.
In this paper it is also assumed that parties are ideological . Unlike the
authors just mentioned we do not introduce uncertainty in the model. Our
distinctive feature will be related to the outcome of the political game. All the
formal models in the literature suppose that the winning party has the power
to implement its proposed policy (at least in the two-party case). We do not
accept this as a realistic and satisfactory way to model the outcome of the
political competition in many modern democratic societies. A democratic
society is formed by different institutions and groups that are relevant to the
political decisions: parliament, trade unions, media, lobbies and so on. Some
of them may be more in favor of the policy that was announced by the
defeated party; others, on the contrary, may be in favor of the winning
party’s proposal. All of them may have some influence on the actions taken
by the government (who is, perhaps, formed by the winning party). The
influence of groups in favor of a proposal will be a nondecreasing function
of the proportion of votes obtained by the corresponding party. Clearly
a party winning 51% of the votes will have more difficulty to carry out
its proposal than one winning 80% of the votes. In general this influence will
not be proportional to the vote share (even more, this relation may be
discontinuous, ‘‘going from (50!e)% to (50#e)% of the vote, no matter how
small is e, can be more valuable than going from 47% to 49%’’, Denzau et al.
1985, p. 96).
This view motivates our assumption that, in the two-party system, the
implemented policy will be a convex combination of the parties’ proposals. The
weights that determine this convex combination will be given by a nondec-
reasing function in the vote share. Clearly, the specific function used should
depend on many institutional and cultural factors.
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We confine ourselves to the analysis of what we call the Proportional
Representation case. Under Proportional Representation the weight asso-
ciated to a proposal is proportional to the vote share. One might think that in
actual democracies implemented policies are not proportional convex combi-
nations of parties proposals and, consequently, our approach is an unrealistic
one. But the standard Hotelling—Downs approach can be criticized also as
very unrealistic: it is hard to believe that it makes no difference to win with
51% or to win with 90% of the votes. Thus, our view is that despite the
unrealism of the Proportional Representation model it is worth studying for
much the same reasons that the standard Hotelling—Downs model is worth
studying. Both models are polar cases that should be understood before
analyzing more realistic ones.
The results obtained in this paper show that under Proportional Repres-
entation, for the two-party system, parties’ proposals do not converge toward
centrist platforms. Furthermore, there is an incentive to become ‘‘radical’’, i.e.,
to put forth proposals that are more extreme than the parties ‘‘ideal’’ policies
(see Poole and Rosenthal (1984, 1991) for empirical evidence of a large
divergence in political platforms). The intuition behind this result is clear.
Consider for example the ‘‘Left’’ party. A move toward more extreme left
positions produces two effects. On the one hand, the number of votes in favor
of this party decreases. Thus, the weight associated to its policy will also
decrease. On the other hand, this weight is now put on a more leftist policy.
The net effect can go either way and it will depend on the distribution of
voters. We characterize cases for which the second effect overcomes the
first one.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the
basic model. Some results on the existence of equilibrium are presented in
Sect. 3. Section 4 provides a more specific model in which agents have
symmetric utility functions and compares the results with the ones obtained
under some probabilistic models. Section 5 concludes and proposes some
issues for further research.
2. The model
Let S"[s
m
, s
M
]LR be the set of agents’ types and „"[t
m
, t
M
]-R
`the set of admissible policies. Agent of type s3S has utility function
v( . ; s) :„PR. The distribution of types is given by an (absolutely continuous)
probability measure F on S. Let t(s)3„ be a most preferred policy by an
agent of type s, i.e., t (s) is such that v (t(s); s)5v (t; s) for all t3„. By part (a) in
the following assumption t(s) always exists and is unique.
Assumption 1. (a) v (t ; s) is strictly concave and differentiable in t. (b) v (t ; s) is
continuous in s. (c) t(s) is strictly increasing in s.
There are two parties denoted by ‚ and R. Party ‚ has a utility function
over the set of admissible policies %
L
:„PR that coincides with the utility
function of agent of type s
L
, i.e., %
L
(t)"v(t ; s
L
) for all t. In a similar way party
R has utility function P
R
:„PR such that %
R
(t)"v (t ; s
R
). Consequently the
‘‘ideal’’ policy for party ‚ is t (s
L
)"l and the ideal one for party R is t(s
R
)"r.
Thus we think of the constituencies of party ‚ and R as formed by agents of
3
type s
R
and s
L
respectively1. We will suppose that s
L
(s
MV
(s
R
where s
MV
is
the median type, i.e. F ( (s : s4s
MV
))"1/2.
The political game is such that each party announces a policy which must
be an element of „. Each agent votes for the party that announced the policy
which gives a higher utility according to his utility function. Let t
L
3„ be the
policy announced by party ‚ and t
R
3„ the one announced by party R. Given
this pair of proposals, (t
L
, t
R
), type s agent votes with probability one for party
‚(R) iff v (t
L
; s)’v (t
R
; s) (iff v (t
L
; s)(v (t
R
; s)) and whenever v (t
L
; s)"v (t
R
; s)
he votes for party ‚(R) with probability 1/2. Note that the set of agents that
would be indifferent between two policies will have measure zero. Let ) (t
L
, t
R
)
be the set of agents who strictly prefer t
L
rather than t
R
, i.e., ) (t
L
, t
R
),Ms3S :
v(t
L
; s)’v(t
R
; s)N and E (t
L
, t
R
) the set of indifferent agents, E(t
L
, t
R
),Ms3S :
v(t
L
; s)"v(t
R
; s)N. Party ‚ obtains the proportion of votes given by
W(t
L
, t
R
)"F ()(t
L
, t
R
))#1/2 F (E (t
L
, t
R
)). The functions v (t ; s) and F are
supposed to be common knowledge.
Now we departure from most theoretical models on political competition: it
is assumed that the implemented policy after the election takes place doesn’t
need to be the one announced by the winner. We suppose that the implemented
policy, which we denote by t (t
L
, t
R
), is a convex combination of the parties
proposals with weights that depend on the percentage of votes obtained by
each party:
t (t
L
, t
R
)"… (W(t
L
, t
R
)) t
L
#(1!… (W (t
L
, t
R
))) t
R
, (1)
where … : [0, 1]P[0, 1].
Several cases can be studied:
„he Standard Model: Here the party that gets more than 50% of the votes
has the power to carry out its announced policy. Thus the winner takes all and
… is given by
…
s
(W(t
L
, t
R
)"





0 if W(t
L
, t
R
)(1/2,
1/2 if W(t
L
, t
R
)"1/2,
1 if W(t
L
, t
R
)’1/2.
Proportional Representation: Here the ‘‘influence’’ of the groups in favor of
a given policy is proportional to the percentage of votes in favor of that policy.
The weights are now given by
…
PR
(W (t
L
, t
R
))"W (t
L
, t
R
) .
Most of the literature modeling party competition adopts the Standard
Model. In this paper, on the contrary, only the Proportional Representation
model will be analyzed. We believe that a more realistic approach should
consider a weight function … that is between these two extreme cases.
Thus in the rest of the paper we assume that, after the election takes place,
the policy implemented is t (t
L
, t
R
)"W(t
L
, t
R
) t
L
#(1!W(t
L
, t
R
) ) t
R
. The util-
ity obtained by each party depends on this implemented policy t (t
L
, t
R
). Then,
1 Nothing essential would change if we allow for constituencies with more than just
one type of agents.
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the objective of a party ‚ is to choose the policy t
L
that solves the following
maximization problem (and similarly for party R):
max
tL
%
L
(t (t
L
, t
R
)). (2)
Definition. A Political Equilibrium is a vector of policies t*"(t*
L
, t*
R
)3„]„
such that
(a) %
L
(t(t*
L
, t*
R
))5%
L
(t(t, t*
R
)) for all t3„,
(b) %
R
(t (t*
L
, t*
R
))5%
R
(t (t*
L
, t) ) for all t3„.
Observe that in our model only parties behave strategically. They care
about the implemented policy and choose their strategies (proposals) to
influence toward their desired directions. Voters, however, always vote ‘‘sin-
cerely’’. An agent votes for the policy that, were it implemented, would give
him a higher utility level. So voters only compare the two proposals and no
the possible final outcomes. Thus, agents are assumed to be less sophisticated
than parties. This is a common restriction in this area of research2.
To obtain positive results we need to introduce some further restrictions
on the admissible preferences.
Assumption 2. (Single Crossing Property). For any policies t @, tA3„, t @OtA,
there is at most one type s3S such that v (t @ ; s)"v (tA ; s).
Assumption 3. t (s
m
)"t
m
and t(s
M
)"t
M
.
The Single Crossing Property assumption is standard in economics and
it is needed to have a ‘‘nice’’ separation of the set of agents for and the set of
agents against a given policy. Assumption 3 is basically technical and it is not
necessary if we assume that for some s3S we have t(s)3 (t
m
, t
M
).
Lemma 1. ”nder assumptions 1—3, and for any (t
L
, t
R
)3„]„, t
L
(t
R
, there
exists a type s
d
(t
L
, t
R
)3S such that all agents with type s(s
d
(t
L
, t
R
) vote for the
same party and agents with types s’s
d
(t
L
, t
R
) vote for the other party.
Proof. Without loss of generality let t
L
(t
R
. By Assumption 3 and strict
concavity of v in t there exists at least one voter who prefers t
L
rather than t
R(type s
m
for example) and there also exists at least a voter who prefers t
R
better
than t
L
(type s
M
for example). Then, by Assumption 1, there must exist s*3S
such that v(t
L
; s*)"v(t
R
; s*) and by Assumption 2 this s* is unique. We can
show now that s* is the type s
d
(t
L
, t
R
) in the lemma. Suppose there exist s @(s*
and sA(s*, s @(sA, such that v (t
L
; s @ )’v (t
R
; s @ ) and v (t
L
; sA )(v(t
R
; sA ). In
this case, there must exist, by Assumption 1, s@@@3S, s @(s@@@(sA such that
v(t
L
; s @@@)"v (t
R
; s*). But this contradicts Assumption 2. Hence all types to the
left of s* vote for the same party. The rest of the proof follows by a similar
argument. Q.E.D.
The existence of this dividing type, s
d
, will make the strategic problem of
the parties simpler. The lemma also implies that, for all t
L
Ot
R
, and given
2 A possible justification for it is that there is a continuum of agents. In this case
a single vote cannot affect the implemented policy. This, however, opens the question
why an agent wants to vote at all. See the last section for further comments.
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that E (t
L
, t
R
)"s
d
, the proportion of voters in favor of party ‚ is
W(t
L
, t
R
)"F () (t
L
, t
R
)) and it can also be shown that whenever t
L
(t
R
we
have )(t
L
, t
R
)"[t
m
, s
d
(t
L
, t
R
)) . By strict concavity of v( ) in t it must be true
that s
d
(t
L
, t
R
) is a strictly increasing function in t
L
(also in t
R
) whenever t
L
Ot
R
.
Therefore s
d
(t
L
, t
R
) is differentiable with respect to t
L
(and t
R
) almost every-
where. So the next assumption is a weak one.
Assumption 4. s
d
(t
L
, t
R
) is differentiable with respect to t
L
and with respect to t
R
.
Our assumptions on s
d
and F imply that W (t
L
, t
R
) is strictly increasing and
differentiable in t
L
and t
R
whenever t
L
(t
R
.
3. Existence of equilibrium
Our task now is to provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a Political
Equilibrium. Let B‚ (t
R
) be the set of best replies of party ‚ to announcement
t
R
by party R, i.e.,
B‚(t
R
),argmax
t3T
P
L
(t(t, t
R
)),
where t(t, t
R
)"W (t, t
R
) t#(1!W(t, t
R
)) t
R
. The best reply correspondence of
party R, BR(t
L
), is defined in a similar way.
To simplify the notation we will write F (s
d
(t
L
, t
R
)) instead of W (t
L
, t
R
)
where F now stands for the cumulative distribution function. The density
function will be denoted by f. To make the proofs simpler we will also assume
that f is differentiable.
To study the existence of a Political Equilibrium we first show that the best
reply correspondence is well defined and, second, we provide conditions to
guarantee that it is single valued.
Given that „ is an interval, a sufficient condition for the correspondence
B‚(t
R
) to be well defined is that %
L
(t(t
L
, t
R
)) is continuous in t
L
. The function
t(t
L
, t
R
) is continuous except possibly at t
L
"t
R
. We now show that the
function P
L
(t(t
L
, t
R
)) is continuous in t
L
. To do this it is enough to prove that
it is continuous at t
L
"t
R
:
lim
t?tR
v (F(s
d
(t, t
R
))) t
R
#(1!F(s
d
(t, t
R
) ) t
R
; s
L
)"v (kt
R
#(1!k) t
R
; s
L
),
where k3 (0, 1),
and this limit is equal to v (F (s
d
(t
R
, t
R
))) t
R
#(1!F (s
d
(t
R
, t
R
)) t
R
;
s
L
)"v (t
R
; s
L
). Therefore B‚(t
R
) is a well defined correspondence.
To simplify notation write g (t
L
, t
R
)"F (s
d
(t
L
, t
R
) ), g* (t
L
, t
R
),
1!F(s
d
(t
L
, t
R
)), g
1
(t
L
, t
R
),dg(t
L
, t
R
)/dt
L
, g
2
(t
L
, t
R
),dg(t
L
, t
R
)/dt
R
. To
guarantee that B‚(t
R
) is always single valued we need some additional
assumptions.
Assumption 5. The ratio g (t
L
, t
R
)/g
1
(t
L
, t
R
) is non-decreasing in t
L
and the
ratio g*(t
L
, t
R
)/g
2
(t
L
, t
R
) is non-increasing in t
R
.
This assumption can be seen as imposing a monotone hazard rate on the
functions g (t
L
, t
R
) and g*(t
L
, t
R
). The interpretation is that as party ‚ moves
its proposal t
L
toward t
R
the percentage of voters in favor of ‚ increases at
a decreasing rate.
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Lemma 2. ”nder assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, B‚(t
R
) is single valued.
Proof. Suppose not. Then for some t
R
there exists t @, tA3B‚ (t
R
). Let t @(tA.
Two cases must be considered:
(i) F (s
d
(t @, t
R
)) t @#(1!F (s
d
(t @, t
R
)) t
R
OF(s
d
(tA, t
R
)) tA#(1!F (s
d
(tA, t
R
)) t
R
.
Suppose first that t
R
’l,the ideal policy of ‚. Observe that by strict
concavity of v (t ; s
L
) it must be the case that t(t @, t
R
)(l(t(tA, t
R
) and
t @(l4tA. We also know that given that f is always greater than zero it must
be the case that t (l, t
R
)’l. Now t (t, t
R
) is continuous in t for t(t
R
. So it
must exist t@@@, t @(t @@@(l, such that t(t @@@, t
R
)"l, and this proves that
t @NB‚(t
R
). A similar argument works for the case t
R
(l. For t
R
"l it is
obvious that l"B‚ (t
R
). It has been proven that if there is more than one
element in B‚(t
R
) all of them must induce the same implemented policy.
(ii) F(s
d
(t@, t
R
))t @#(1!F(s
d
(t@, t
R
) ) t
R
"F(s
d
(tA, t
R
)) tA#(1!F (s
d
(tA, t
R
))) t
R
.
Consider first the case l(t
R
. Given that F(s
d
(t
L
, t
R
)) is strictly monotone in t
Land v( ) is strictly concave we have that both t @ and tA must be to the left of t
R
.
By the same argument given in (i) we know that l4t @. Therefore we have
l4t @(tA(t
R
and both t @ and tA are in the interior of „; this fact and the
differentiability of v (F (s
d
(t, t
R
) ) t#(1!F (s
d
(t
L
, t
R
) ) t
R
; s
L
) with respect to t
Lallow us to use the following first order conditions from ‚’s maximization
problem,
f (s
d
(t, t
R
) ) [ds
d
(t, t
R
)/dt]t#F (s
d
(t, t
R
))!f (s
d
(t, t
R
) ) [ds
d
(t, t
R
)/dt] t
R
"0.
Let [d (s
d
(t, t
R
))/dt],s @
d
(t, t
R
). Then the first order conditions can be rewritten
as follows:
t
R
!t"F (s
d
(t, t
R
))/[ f (s
d
(t, t
R
) )s@
d
(t, t
R
)].
Since t@(tA we have
F(s
d
(t @, t
R
))/[ f (s
d
(t @, t
R
) ) s@
d
(t @, t
R
)]"t
R
!t @’t
R
!t @@
"F (s
d
(tA, t
R
))/[ f (s
d
(t @@, t
R
)) s @
d
(tA, t
R
)]
and these inequalities can be written as
g(t @, t
R
)/g
1
(t @, t
R
)"t
R
!t @’t
R
!tA"g (tA, t
R
)/g
1
(tA, t
R
)
which is in contradiction with Assumption 5.
The case l’t
R
can be proven in a similar way. Q.E.D.
We can proceed in the same way to show that BR(t
L
) is also single valued.
In the following, we show that under the assumptions introduced so far
a Political Equilibrium always exists. The second part of Theorem 3 shows
that in equilibrium parties propose different policies. The last part states that
whenever the equilibrium is an interior one, both parties obtain the same
number of votes3 . This implies that the ‘‘median’’ voter is indifferent between
3 This last result depends very much on the proportional representation assumption.
In a more general model with weights different from …
PR
this wouldn’t be true.
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the two equilibrium policies. It can be easily shown, however, that in general
t(t*
L
, t*
R
) will be different from t(s
MV
) . Thus not only the equilibrium strategies
of parties differ from the ones in the standard model but the outcome of the
game as well.
Theorem 3. Suppose Assumptions 1—5 hold. Then
(i) a Political Equilibrium, (t*
L
, t*
R
), exists,
(ii) t*
L
(t*
R(iii) If t
m
(t*
L
(t*
R
(t
M
then s
d
(t*
L
, t*
R
)"s
MV
.
Proof. (i) Let B :„]„P„]„ be defined by B (t
L
, t
R
)"(B‚(t
R
), BR (t
L
) ). By
Lemma 2, B is single valued. To apply Brower’s Fixed Point Theorem we only
need to show that B is continuous. Continuity of B follows from the continuity
of %
L
(t(t
L
, t
R
)) and P
R
(t(t
L
, t
R
)) in (t
L
, t
R
) and Berge’s Maximum Theorem. (ii)
Suppose they were proposing the same policy, say t @, and that w.l.o.g. l(t @.
Clearly t(t @, t @)"t @’t ( l, t @)’l. Thus party ‚ would be better off proposing
l rather than t @ and hence (t @, t @) cannot be an equilibrium. It is not difficult to
see that t
R
(t
L
cannot be an equilibrium either. (iii) When the equilibrium
policies belong to the interior of „ the first order conditions of the maxi-
mization problems imply that F (s
d
(t*
L
, t*
R
))"1!(F (s
d
(t*
L
, t*
R
))), hence
F(s
d
(t*
L
, t*
R
) )"0.5. Q.E.D.
It is important to realize that our existence proof depends very much on
Assumption 5. Unfortunately, it is questionable whether this is a natural
assumption. The problem with this assumption is that imposes a joint restric-
tion on the set of admissible utility functions and the set of admissible
distributions of types. Note that the very standard condition of increasing
hazard rate of the distribution function of s is not enough for Assumption 5 to
hold. It is also needed that s @
d
changes in the right direction.
4. Symmetric preferences
Many models analyzed in the literature consider the case of symmetric
preferences. An agent with symmetric preferences always votes for the closest
proposal to his ideal policy (see for example Eaton and Lipsey (1975) and
Denzau (1985) where agents have symmetric preferences and the distribution
of ideal points is uniform; see also Cox (1987) where this distribution is not
necessarily uniform). Through this section we will assume that agents have
symmetric preferences. The reason why we study this more restrictive model
is twofold. First, if we assume this type of preferences, monotonicity on
the hazard rate of the distribution function of ideal policies is sufficient to
guarantee the existence of equilibrium. Second, we will be able to compare our
results with the ones obtained under other voting models.
Assumption 6 (Symmetric preferences). For all s3S and for all x such that
t(s)#x3„, t(s)!x3„, we have v (t(s)#x; s)"v(t(s)!x; s).
Assumption 7. Voter ideal policies, t(s),q, are distributed according to a
continuous distribution function F(q) with differentiable density function f (q).
Furthermore, the ratio F (q)/ f (q) is non-decreasing in q and the ratio
(1!F (q))/ f (q) is non-increasing in q.
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This assumption is equivalent to requiring that both log F and log(1!F)
be concave. This condition is weaker than concavity of log f (see Barlow and
Proschan 1975). Most commonly used density functions are log-concave and
therefore satisfy Assumption 7 (see Caplin and Nalebuff 1991 for a list of the
class of log-concave densities and Pratt 1981 for examples of distribution
functions for which log (1!F) and log F are concave but log f is not).
Theorem 4. ”nder Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7
(i) a Political Equilibrium, (t*
L
, t*
R
), exists,
(ii) t*
L
(t*
R
, and
(iii) if t
m
(t*
L
(t*
R
(t
M
then s
d
(t*
L
, t*
R
)"s
MV
and t (t*
L
, t*
R
)"t(s
MV
) .
Proof. By Assumption 6, the ideal policy of the ‘‘dividing’’ type is
t(s
d
(t
L
, t
R
))"(t
R
#t
L
)/2. All the agents with ideal policy to the left of (t
R
#t
L
)/2
will vote for ‚. In this case we have that
F(t(s
d
(t
L
, t
R
)))/[ f (t(s
d
(t
L
, t
R
))) s@
d
(t
L
, t
R
)]"2F(0.5(t
L
#t
R
))/[ f (0.5(t
L
#t
R
))].
Assumption 7 implies that this ratio is non-decreasing in t
L
. It is not difficult
to see that such ratio is the same one we used in Assumption 5,
g(t
L
, t
R
)/g
1
(t
L
, t
R
) (in the same way we can obtain a ratio similar to
g*(t
L
, t
R
)/g
2
(t
L
, t
R
) so that all the conditions of Theorem 3 are also satisfied
here). Thus, only the last equality in (iii) remains to be proven. At equilibrium
both parties obtain the same number of votes. Hence the dividing type must
be the median voter and, by symmetry of preferences, the implemented policy
coincides with the median voter’s ideal policy. Q.E.D.
It is important to remark that here the equilibrium implements the policy
most preferred by the median voter. This fact depends very much on the
symmetry of the preferences and, as noted in the previous section, is not
true for more general models. The equilibrium policies, however, do not
converge.
The non-convergence result is also obtained in other models considering
ideological parties (Wittman 1983, 1990; Calvert 1985; Roemer 1993, 1994;
Shultz 1995). All these models assume that there is uncertainty about the
distribution of voter preferences (consequently the outcome of an election is
probabilistic) and that the implemented policy is the one proposed by the
winner. We will show that our approach not only provides a different political
equilibrium from the one associated to these probabilistic models but what is
even more important, it captures a different kind of trade-off parties might
face when choosing their proposals.
In the probabilistic case, given the proposals (t
L
, t
R
) party ‚ wins the
election with probability p (t
L
, t
R
). This probability can be defined in several
different ways and is always assumed to be decreasing in the distance between
t
L
and t
R
. One possibility is to make p (t
L
, t
R
)"F (t(s
d
(t
L
, t
R
))) so that the
weights in our model are now the probabilities of winning the election.
Regardless of the specific function used to defined p (t
L
, t
R
) we have that on the
one hand party ‚ has an incentive to choose a policy that is close to his ideal
one. On the other hand, a policy too close to the ideal one may induce a very
low probability of winning the election and since the implemented policy is the
one proposed by the winner ‚ also has an incentive to move toward the policy
announced by R. As a result of these two forces we have that in all these
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probabilistic models: (i) at the equilibrium parties do not converge in
their policies, (ii) the equilibrium policies lie in between the ideal policies l
and r.
To see the result in (ii) suppose that party ‚ is proposing a policy t
L
(l. It
is clear that t
L
cannot be part of an equilibrium: moving t
L
toward t
R
increases
p(t
L
, t
R
), the probability of winning, and if ‚ wins the implemented policy is
closer to its ideal policy l. Hence that movement toward t
R
increases the
expected utility of party ‚.
These probabilistic models and our Proportional Representation model
only share point (i) above in common but not (ii). This discrepancy is due to
the fact that in our model the proposal of the defeated party always has some
direct influence on the implemented policy. The following specific example
will help to see the importance of this difference.
Suppose that t
m
"0, t
M
"1. Let f, the density of ideal policies, be tri-
angular4 and symmetric, i.e., f (x)"4x for 04x41/2 and f (x)"4(1!x) for
1/24x41. In this case, the median and the mean ideal policies are both
equal to 1/2. Let parties’ ideal policies be such that 1/4(l(1/2(r(3/4.
Under any of the equilibrium probabilistic models mentioned above the
equilibrium policies, (t @
L
, t @
R
), have to lie in between l and r, i.e., l(t @
L
(t @
R
(r.
In our model, on the contrary, straightforward calculations show that the
unique Political Equilibrium is (t*
L
"1/4 , t*
R
"3/4). Thus, parties propose
platforms that are more radical than their ideal policies. This happens even for
the cases in which a majority of voters lie in between l and r.
More dramatic examples are also possible. For instance, if the density
function f is either uniform or U-shaped it can be shown that the unique
Political Equilibrium in our model is (t*
L
"0, t*
R
"1). Thus, when there are
more voters close to the extremes of the political spectrum than in the middle,
the Political Equilibrium is a complete radical one (but not the implemented
policy that continues to be in the middle.) Under the probabilistic models,
however, the equilibrium policies remain in the center.
5. Final comments
We have analyzed a very simple theoretical model of party competition with
two main distinctive features: (i) parties are ideological, (ii) the policy imple-
mented after the election does not need to coincide with the one proposed by
the winner. We take the view that in many democratic societies minorities also
have some influence on the policies implemented. Thus the policy adopted
should be a ‘‘compromise’’ that considers all the proposals made by the
different parties. The weight given to each proposal is related to the popular
support obtained by each party. In particular we have analyzed the propor-
tional representation case in which the weights are proportional to the
number of votes.
It has been shown that parties have incentives to diverge in their propo-
sals. Sometimes these incentives may be strong enough to make parties to
4 The fact that f is not differentiable at x"1/2 is not relevant for the present example.
10
adopt very radical policies. This result makes our approach different from
other models in which parties are also ideological.
Voters in our model behave in a non-strategic way. An agent always votes
for the ‘‘closest’’ proposal and does not take into account the possible
influence in the implemented policy. If there is a continuum of agents
this seems a reasonable assumption since any single vote has a negligible
effect on the implemented policy. It is also reasonable to assume that in
real cases voters are less well informed than parties about the way the
electoral outcome induces the specific weights used to determine the
implemented policy. If instead the Proportional Representation case
we consider a more realistic one in which those weights are given by non-
linear functions this assumption would be even more reasonable. The implica-
tions of allowing for more sophisticated type of voters are left for future
research.
Additional future work should also consider a more realistic function
… and provide a better justification of the assumption that the implemented
policy is a compromise between the two announced policies and not a compro-
mise in between the two ideal policies of the parties. This compromise could be
reached in the space of utilities rather than in the policy space. The analysis
should also be extended to the multiparty and multidimensional policy space
cases.
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